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Abstract. Trust and Reputation Systems (TRSs) represent a signifi-
cant trend in decision support for Internet-based interactions. They help
users to decide whom to trust and how much to trust a transaction. They
are also an effective mechanism to encourage honesty and cooperation
among users, resulting in healthy online markets or communities. The
basic idea is to let parties rate each other so that new public knowledge
can be created from personal experiences. The major difficulty in design-
ing a reputation system is making it robust against malicious attacks.
Our contribution in this paper is twofold. Firstly, we combine multi-
ple research agendas into a holistic approach to building a robust TRS.
Secondly, we focus on one TRS component which is the reputation com-
puting engine and provide a novel investigation into an implementation
of the engine proposed in [7].
1 Introduction
Information concerning the reputation of individuals has always been spread
by word-of-mouth and has been used as an enabler of numerous economic and
social activities. Especially now, with the development of technology and, in
particular, the Internet, reputation information can be broadcast more easily
and faster than ever before. Trust and Reputation Systems (TRSs) have gained
the attention of many information and computer scientists since the early 2000s.
TRSs have a wide range of applications and are domain specific. The multiple
areas where they are applied, include social web platforms, e-commerce, peer-to-
peer networks, sensor networks, ad-hoc network routing, and so on [5]. Among
these, we are most interested in social web platforms. We observe that trust and
reputation is used in many online systems, such as online auction and shopping
websites, including eBay [1], where people buy and sell a broad variety of goods
and services, and Amazon [2], which is a world famous online retailer. Online
services with TRSs provide a better safety to their users. A good TRS can also
create incentives for good behavior and penalize damaging actions. As noted by
? Corresponding author.
Resnick et al. [10], markets with the support of TRSs will be healthier, with a
variety of prices and quality of service. TRSs are very important for an online
community, with respect to the safety of participants, robustness of the network
against malicious behavior and for fostering a healthy market.
From a functional point of view, a TRS can be split into three components,
as justified in [9]. The first component gathers feedback on participants’ past
behavior from the transactions that they were involved in. This component in-
cludes storing feedback from users after each transaction they take part in. The
second component computes reputation scores for participants through a Repu-
tation Computing Engine (RCE), based on the gathered information. The third
component processes the reputation scores, implementing appropriate reward
and punishment policies if needed, and representing reputation scores in a way
which gives as much support as possible to users’ decision-making. A TRS can
be centralized or distributed. In centralized TRSs, there is a central authority re-
sponsible for collecting ratings and computing reputation scores for users. Most
of the TRSs currently on the Internet are centralized, for example the feedback
system on eBay [1] and customer reviews on Amazon [2]. On the other hand, a
distributed TRS has no central authority. Each user has to collect ratings and
compute reputation scores for other users himself. Almost all proposed TRSs in
the literature are distributed [7,9,5].
Some of the main unwanted behaviors of users that might appear in TRSs
are: free riding (people are usually not willing to give feedback if they are not
given an incentive to do so [10]), untruthful rating (users give incorrect feedback
either because of malicious intent or because of unintended and uncontrolled
variables), colluding (a group of users coordinate their behavior to inflate each
other’s reputation scores or bad-mouth other competitors. Colluding motives are
only clear in a specific application), whitewashing (a user creates a new identity
in the system to replace his old one when the reputation of the old one has gone
bad), milking reputation (at first, a participant behaves correctly to get a high
reputation and then turns bad to make a profit from their high reputation score).
The milking reputation behavior is more harmful to social network services and
e-commerce than to the others. More types of attacks can be found in [4,5].
In this section, we provide readers with a brief overview of TRSs with respect
to their applications, components, classification and potential attacks. The rest
of the paper is organized as follows. Sect. 2 introduces readers to our research
methodology and gives an agenda for building a TRS which is robust against
attacks. Sect. 3 details the implemented RCE. Sect. 4 reports the results from a
thorough simulation on the engine. Sect. 5 and 6 discuss related work and our
future areas of study respectively.
2 Trust and Reputation System Design Agenda
The design of a robust TRS is already partially addressed in several academic
papers [5,4,3]. In this section, we aim to build on these studies and systematize
the process of designing a TRS in general as in Fig. 1. First, we characterize the
application system into which we want to integrate a TRS, and find and identify
new elements of information which substitute for traditional signs of trust and
reputation in the physical world [5]. Second, based on the characteristics of the
application, we find suitable working mechanisms and processes for each com-
ponent of the TRS, as already introduced in Sect. 1. This step should answer
the following questions: “What kind of information do we need to collect and
how?”, “How should the reputation scores be computed using the collected in-
formation?”, and “How should they be represented and processed to lead users
to a correct decision?”. To answer the first question, which corresponds to the
information gathering component, we should take advantage of information tech-
nology to collect the vast amounts of necessary data [5]. According to [5], a RCE
should meet these criteria: accuracy for long-term performance (distinguishing a
newcomer with unknown quality from a low-quality participant who has stayed
in the system for a long time), weighting towards recent behavior, smoothness
(adding any single rating should not change the score significantly), and ro-
bustness against attacks. The work in [3] is an effective guide for social web
applications. It is applicable directly to the tasks of designing the information
gathering and decision support components. Third, we study the tentative de-
sign obtained after the second step in the presence of selfish behaviors. During
the third step, we can repeatedly return to Step 2 whenever appropriate until
the system reaches a desired performance. The fourth step will refine the TRS
and make it more robust against malicious attacks, some of which are listed in
Sect. 1. If a modification is made, we should return to Step 2 and check all the
conditions in steps 2 and 3 before accepting the modification (Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1. Process of designing a robust trust and reputation system.
In different applications, there are different kinds of available information and ac-
tivities, hence different ways of computing reputation scores and different types
of attacks. Accordingly, designing a TRS must be put in the specific context of
an application. Most of the challenges for a TRS are induced by selfish and mali-
cious behaviors. The problems arising from malicious behaviors are usually more
complicated and difficult to cope with than those caused by normal selfish users.
Therefore, the logic of our methodology is to first design a TRS that works for
a community where all the members are obedient, and then increase the sophis-
tication of the system to cope with selfish members and finally with malicious
ones. After having a TRS which is robust against some kinds of attacks, we can
continue testing its robustness, using the approaches proposed in [4]. These are:
implementing the system in reality, performing a theoretical test by third par-
ties so that the evaluation is more credible, and defining a comprehensive set of
robustness evaluation methods and criteria.
3 Reputation Computing Engine
Among the three components of a TRS, information gathering is most dependent
on the application system, followed by the decision support component and then
by the RCE. Accordingly, the next step in our research will be building a robust
RCE, which will be as general as possible so that the engine is applicable to a
variety of applications. In the following part of this section, we will elaborate on
our assumptions, concepts and the implementation of a preliminary computing
engine which is a specification and a simplification of the framework proposed
in [5].
3.1 Assumptions and Notations
There is a large group of systems where the transactions are bilateral. In these
systems, for each transaction there are two parties that we call consumer and
provider. The consumer is the one who requests the service, while the provider is
the one who is capable of providing the service. When we add a TRS to this kind
of system, a user can have an additional role as a rater who has interacted with
the provider before and therefore has an opinion about the provider’s service.
When a consumer needs a service, he collects ratings on the candidate providers
and computes reputation scores for them. The consumer then ranks the providers
according to their reputation scores and chooses one of the top ranked providers
to interact with.
Without losing generality, we consider the RCE within the context of a service
having one criterion to be judged. An example of service with multiple criteria is
that provided by an eBay user [1]. As of May 2012, this service has been judged
by four criteria, including “Item as described”, “Communication”, “Shipping
time”, and “Shipping and handling charges”. The single criterion in our example
is called “Quality of Service” (QoS), whose value is normalized to the interval
[0, 1], where 1 is the optimal value. Correspondingly, the rating value is in the
range [0, 1] and the optimal value is also 1. The following are the main variables
that a consumer will use for his computation. They are private information and
accessible only to the owner.
Rater Credibility (Cr): reputation of a user in giving accurate feedback. It
reflects how much the consumer should trust the rater r’s ratings. The value
range is [0, 1] and it is initiated at 0.5.
Usefulness factor (Ur): Ur = Nuseful/S, where Nuseful is the number of times
that the rater r submits useful ratings, S is the total number of submissions.
After a transaction, if the difference between a rating and the outcome ob-
served by the consumer is under a predefined threshold then the rating is
useful. We set the threshold at 0.2 and the initial value of Ur at 0.5.
Personal evaluation (Ep): the consumer’s first-hand experience with the provider
p. Ep ∈ [0, 1]. We set Ep as the experience of the last transaction with the
provider. It might not be available if the consumer has never done any trans-
actions with this provider.
Previously assessed reputation score (A): the last computed reputation score
of a provider when the consumer interacted with him. If the consumer has
never interacted with this provider, then A will be initiated as 0.5.
3.2 Adjusting Raters’ Credibility
After collecting ratings on a provider’s service, the consumer will adjust raters’
credibility which will be used to calculate weights for the ratings. The two main
criteria which adjust a rater’s credibility are the consistency of his rating to other
raters and to the previous reputation score A of the provider. We use a modi-
fication of the K-means clustering algorithm in [6] to find the majority rating
value among the raters. The main idea of this algorithm is to divide the rating
set into clusters, so that similar ratings are grouped into the same cluster, while
different ones are separated into different clusters. The most crowded cluster is
then labeled as the majority and its mean is the majority rating M . The values
used to decide if ratings belong to the same or different clusters are affected by
coarsening and refinement distances, C and R respectively: 0 ≤ C ≤ R ≤ 1. The
three parameters of the algorithm are C, R, and the initial number of clusters.
After having M , the consumer computes factor Mfr ∈ [0, 1], which has the effect
of changing rater r’s credibility, due to the closeness of its rating Rr to M .
Mfr =

1− |Rr −M |
σM
if |Rr −M | < σM
1− σM|Rr −M | otherwise
where σM is the standard deviation of the received rating set, i.e.:
σM =
√√√√∑NRr=1R2r
NR
− (
NR∑
r=1
Rr
NR
)2
with NR is the total number of collected ratings. Factor A
f = 1 has an effect
on the change of a rater’s credibility, due to the closeness of its rating to A. We
denote ℵ = Cr × (1− |Rr −M |), and ρ the consumer’s pessimism factor which
has a suggested minimum value of 2 (ρ ≥ 2). The credibility Cr of rater r is
adjusted as follows:
1. If rating Rr is similar to both M and A, i.e., (|Rr−M | < 0.1) and (|Rr−A| <
0.1), then: Cr = min(1, Cr + ℵ × M
f
r +A
f
ρ
).
2. If (|Rr −M | < 0.1) and (|Rr −A| ≥ 0.1), then Cr is still increased, but less
than the first case: Cr = min(1, Cr + ℵ × M
f
r
ρ
).
3. If (|Rr −M | ≥ 0.1) and (|Rr − A| < 0.1), then Cr is decreased a little bit:
Cr = max(0, Cr − ℵ × A
f
ρ
).
4. If (|Rr −M | ≥ 0.1) and (|Rr − A| ≥ 0.1), then Cr is decreased the most:
Cr = max(0, Cr − ℵ × M
f
r +A
f
ρ
).
According to the above formulas, a pessimistic consumer with high ρ will increase
Cr slowly for a rating consistent with M and A. Finally, Cr = Cr × Ur.
3.3 Computing Assessed Reputation Score
To prepare weights for collected ratings, in addition to the credibility of raters,
we also need to calculate temporal factors (f t) for ratings and Ep. The reason
for using f t is to give more weight to the more recent information. Depending
on the characteristics of the service and the discretion of the designers, f t can
be calculated in different ways. We propose one example here. Ratings and Ep
are arranged into chronological order and then a f tr corresponding to each rating
Rr or f
t
E for Ep is calculated, which is the inverse of the number of ratings
(S) counted between Rr and the latest rating inclusively: f
t
r = 1/S. Then the
assessed reputation score of provider p is computed as in the following formula:
Repp =
(
∑NR
r=1(Rr × Cr × f tr) + Ep × f tE)
(
∑NR
r=1 Cr + 1)
Where NR is the total number of collected ratings and Ep is the consumer’s
first-hand experience (if available) with the provider.
4 Simulation results
We have implemented the RCE described above and tested it under different
user behaviors. The details of our simulation in Java language are the following.
4.1 Simulation Settings
We set up a population of Nu users, providing the same service, and undertaking
Nt transactions. In each transaction, a random consumer is assigned to request
the service. Other users will then be candidate providers for this request. When a
user plays the role of a consumer, his behavior is modeled in raterType attribute.
Three types of raters include HONEST, DISHONEST and COLLUSIVE. HONEST
raters share their personal experience honestly, i.e. Rr = Ep. DISHONEST raters
provide ratings 0.5 different from their true estimation, i.e. Rr = Ep ± 0.5.
COLLUSIVE raters give the highest ratings (Rr = 1) to users in their collu-
sion and the lowest ratings (Rr = 0) to the rest. Similarly, when a user acts
as a provider, he can be one of the following types of providers: GOOD, NOR-
MAL, BAD, or GOODTURNBAD. This type is denoted in providerType attribute.
The QoS of the service provided by a BAD, NORMAL, or GOOD provider has a
value in the interval (0, 0.4], (0.4, 0.7], or (0.7, 1] respectively. A GOODTURNBAD
provider will change the QoS of his service when 50% of Nt transactions have
been done in the simulation. To get a transaction done, a consumer obtains a
list of providers, computes reputation scores for them, chooses a provider to
perform the transaction, updates his private information, and publishes his rat-
ing for the provider. The quality of service that the consumer will experience
depends on the providerType of the chosen provider. The difference between
the consumer’s rating for the provider and his observation depends on the con-
sumer’s raterType. In our simulation, providerType and raterType of a user
are independent.
For each user, we have two measures: pp which is the percentage of Nt trans-
actions, in which the user has performed as the provider; and ad = |Repp − Ep|
which is an average of absolute difference between the Repp before a transaction
and the Ep after the transaction. Apparently, pp should be proportional to the
user’s QoS and can be referred to as the user’s “Market Share”. ad reflects the
correctness of the system in assessing a provider’s QoS and is captured when
a user plays the role of a consumer. We repeat a simulation at least five times
before taking the average values to analyze. A simulation run is denoted:
Simulation(Nu, Nt, %G, %N , %B, %GTB, %H, %D, %C, %dataLost).
Where %G, %N , %B, %GTB are the percentage of GOOD, NORMAL, BAD, and
GOODTURNBAD providers in the population respectively, so that %G + %N +
%B+%GTB = 100%. %H, %D, %C are the percentage of HONEST, DISHONEST,
and COLLUSIVE raters respectively, so that %H+%D+%C = 100%. %dataLost
is the percentage of ratings on a specific provider which are not available for the
consumer at the moment he computes the reputation score for the provider.
4.2 User Decision Simulation
We observe that, in reality, a user might not always choose a provider with
the highest reputation score. This is due to the complexity of human decision-
making, which is based not only on reputation and personal experience but
also on many other factors, such as aversion, bias, antecedents and mood. For
the purpose of examining a TRS, we model a user’s decision-making in the
following selection strategy. The consumer ranks candidate providers based on
their reputation scores and makes a cut-off, removing those having scores lower
than (Top − 0.5), where Top is the score of the first ranked provider. He then
uses a Gaussian distribution having standard deviation σ =
√
NSize and mean
a = 0 to calculate Gaussian random values (Gp)s for providers in the short list
of size NSize. Accordingly, the Gp of a provider depends on NSize and its rank in
the list but not on its absolute reputation score Repp. Finally, the consumer opts
for a provider randomly, with a probability proportional to the provider’s Gp.
The intuition of this strategy is that the providers with higher Repp, therefore
higher rank, will have higher chance to be chosen.
4.3 Simulation Scenarios and Analysis
In this section, we are going to apply the methodology mentioned in Sect. 2 to
study the implemented RCE. We examine the engine to see firstly, if it works
correctly when all users are obedient, secondly if it is robust against selfish users
and thirdly, if it is robust against malicious users.
Obedient Users. We consider obedient users to be those who provide a ser-
vice correctly, as stated, to the best of their ability, and share their personal
experience honestly with the community. Applying this concept to our simula-
tion model, they are GOOD, NORMAL, or BAD providers and HONEST raters.
Simulation on obedient users with parameters:
Simulation(200, 10000, 10, 20, 70, 0, 100, 0, 0, 0).
shows that BAD providers are avoided always.
Selfish Users. A selfish behavior in generic TRSs can be named as free riding.
The consumer does not give feedback to the system after a transaction. We sim-
ulated that behavior in an approximate manner using the parameter %dataLost:
Simulation(200, 10000, 10, 20, 70, 0, 100, 0, 0, 60).
The result obtained is almost the same as the one when all the users are obedient.
It proves that the engine still functions even when 60% of the ratings which are
supposed to be supplied are not available.
Malicious Raters. As raters, malicious users can be categorized as DISHONEST
or COLLUSIVE. DISHONEST raters act individually, while COLLUSIVE ones act in
groups. It is difficult to identify COLLUSIVE users, especially when they form a
large group. The simulation with the presence of DISHONEST raters:
Simulation(200, 10000, 10, 20, 70, 0, 30, 70, 0, 0).
shows that the error in computing (Repp)s for BAD providers is 0.39 on average.
And this error gives them a chance to acquire 13% × Nt transactions. Second,
we run a simulation with the presence of COLLUSIVE raters, where 60% of users
collude as a group against the rest:
Simulation(200, 10000, 10, 20, 70, 0, 40, 0, 60, 0).
The error in computing (Repp)s are now increased for all types of providers
(Fig. 2). Especially, for BAD users, the error reaches 0.57, which is quite high.
However, the market share of these BAD providers is only 7%, which is acceptable
compared to their population percentage of 60%.
Malicious Providers. A provider displaying malicious behavior and milking
reputation can be modeled by GOODTURNBAD users:
Simulation(200, 10000, 10, 10, 70, 10, 100, 0, 0, 0).
We observe that when the users change the QoS of their service from high to
low, they continue to get high reputation scores and have a high chance of being
10%
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Fig. 2. Simulation results for a scenario with COLLUSIVE raters forming a group.
selected for many transactions later. Even a consumer who has experienced the
bad service of a GOODTURNBAD provider, can still choose the provider again.
From these results, we conclude that the current engine is robust against a
population displaying dishonest behavior of up to 70% and colluding behavior
of up to 60% of the population, but still vulnerable to milking reputation attack.
5 Related Work
After a thorough survey of the current research, we find the model proposed in
[7] the most interesting. The service oriented environment analyzed in the paper
fits into the bilateral transaction environment we are aiming at. The experimen-
tal results that are provided are appealing. However, the disadvantage of this
model is that it is complicated to implement. Furthermore, it is not clear which
specific formulas and parameter values were used by the authors to get the re-
sults presented in the paper. In their proposed framework, a number of formulas
are left open to readers. Such formulas include the one for updating personal
evaluations and the one for aggregating the provider’s assessed reputations at
previous time instances. Some other points that are unclear in the paper, are the
thresholds used to estimate if a rating is useful, to decide if a rating is similar to
the majority rating and if it is similar to previously assessed reputations. In our
opinion, the variance of these formulas and thresholds all affect the precision of
assessed reputations and this concern has forced us to re-implement their model
but using a simpler form. From a technical point of view, we have adopted the
credibility update algorithm from the RateWeb framework [7]. Then we apply
our methodology to study the robustness of the implemented engine. For the
simulation, we propose a new measure which is the percentage of market share
that a user gains. In terms of the accuracy of the reputation values, the results in
our simulation are not as good as in [7] due to the modification we made to the
engine and the simulation/experimental settings. The critical difference between
the experimental settings in [7] and our simulation settings is the existence of
bootstrapping. We assign a neutral default value to newcomers (initiating A,
Cr, and Ur to 0.5) as a simple bootstrapping mechanism integrated into the
computing engine and let every user start from scratch. On the other hand, [7]
assumes that the bootstrapping has been done and that the system is running
with correct reputation scores and credibilities.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented our preliminary work on building a trust and
reputation framework for social web platforms which will be robust against at-
tacks. We propose a research methodology which can be used to study the ro-
bustness of many TRSs, and also implement a model which is a simplified and
modified version of the RateWeb engine [7]. Since the experimental results in [7]
were no longer correct for the implemented engine, we applied our methodology
to study it. The results of the simulation showed a flaw in the engine, which
is vulnerable to milking reputation attack. For that reason, we have decided to
design a new RCE. During the course of studying the implemented engine, we
realized that we needed a common tool and measuring system to compare the
performance of multiple engines. Unfortunately, there is very little work in the
literature on simulation tools and TRS performance measures. We have found
only one implemented simulator for TRSs in sensor networks [8], whose mea-
suring system is not applicable to our context. Therefore, another branch of our
research in the future will be building a simulator with measures suitable for so-
cial web applications, as we have introduced partly in Sect. 4. We are interested
not only in the accuracy of the TRSs, but also in how they shape the community.
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